Abstract-Moving Target Defense (MTD) has received significant focus in technical publications. The publications describe MTD approaches that periodically change some attribute of the computer network system. The attribute that is changed, in most cases, is one that an adversary attempts to gain knowledge of through reconnaissance and may use its knowledge of the attribute to exploit the system. The fundamental mechanism an MTD uses to secure the system is to change the system attributes such that the adversary never gains the knowledge and cannot execute an exploit prior to the attribute changing value. Thus, the MTD keeps the adversary from gaining the knowledge of attributes necessary to exploit the system.
INTRODUCTION
Moving Target Defenses (MTD) is a class of computer network defenses that changes or moves specific parameters of a computer or network. MTD has an objective of disrupting an attacker's ability to perform reconnaissance and exploitation of a computer network by changing, in an unpredictable process, parameters of a computer system. The unpredictability of the MTD approach disrupts many computer system attacks that follow a multistep process beginning with reconnaissance of the system. In most cases, attackers spend significant time mapping and silently exploring target computer systems for desired data and other assets, system vulnerabilities, and potential pivot points prior to launching their attacks. In a typical computer system attack, an attacker will also explore options in the target system to exfiltrate data undetected. In one example of MTD, the attacker's reconnaissance becomes useless to the attacker because an MTD has changed the target system in such a way that the attacker is no longer familiar with system. This leads to the attacker dropping attempts to attack the system, unsuccessfully attempting to attack system, or the attacker must significantly expedite their attack attempt and thus become significantly more noisy and risk being detected by other system security measures.
The idea of MTD has caught the attention of a large number of computer network security researchers, with numerous MTD techniques proposed in scientific research papers. A 2014 research paper [1] noted an initial survey that identified greater than 120 academic papers describing various MTD techniques and approaches. Since then research papers have proposed additional MTD approaches. However, to date, few MTD approaches have been implemented in operational systems. An example of an MTD implementation is a commonly deployed host-based MTD approach named Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [2] . This dynamic runtime environment approach is a memory-location technique that can assist in defeating code-injection attacks by randomizing the memory layout of application program code.
A partial reason for the limited deployment of MTD in operational systems is the lack of practical experience in deploying MTD and the lack of analytics describing the effectiveness of proposed MTD techniques and approaches. One aspect of deploying MTD in a system is its cost of deployment or defensive work factor [3] . Another aspect is the MTD's ability to enable security and thwart attacks. In many cases, measuring aspects of MTD techniques and approaches is best performed in actual experiments of MTD deployed in specific types of computer network systems. The experiments can be done in simulation, emulation, real system, or hybrid environments. Hybrid environments may be composed of any combination of simulation, emulation, and real systems [4] .
MTD techniques and applications can be applied to most any part of a system (computer and network) with the objective of inducing changes in individual host and/or network system structure, architecture, and/or parameters. Thus, segmenting MTD techniques into groups is a common approach. In this paper, we segment MTD techniques into three classes: hostbased, platform-based, and network-based MTD techniques. MTD techniques and approaches will fall into a single class or may be a combination of multiple varying system structure, architecture, or parameters and thus fit into multiple classes.
A. Our contribution:
Our goal is to identify and develop experimental techniques to evaluate the various aspects of MTD techniques and approaches. One objective is to categorize into classes the various MTD approaches and identify appropriate environments to perform experimentation. Identification of necessary fidelity in experiments is described for the various classes of MTD. Recent advances in virtual machine (VM) and container technologies have led to not only techniques to implement MTD, but techniques to create system-level experiments to evaluate MTD methods. Furthermore, the introduction of Software Defined Networking (SDN) as a contemporary technology that enables network-based MTD along with traditional network technologies presents challenges in creating experiments targeting the evaluation and analysis of network-based MTD. In this paper, various approaches to performing experimentation of MTD techniques and approaches are described. Additionally, an effective approach for experimentation combining the various types of assessments into a single hybrid experiment for analysis of MTD is described.
II. TYPES OF MOVING TARGET DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
MTD techniques can be applied to most any part of a computer network system with the objective of inducing changes to the system structure, architecture, and/or parameters. In this paper, we segment MTD techniques into three classes: host-based, platform-based, and network-based. In test cases, the MTD technique will fall into a single class or may be a combination of varying system structure, architecture, or parameters and thus fit into multiple classes.
A. Host-based MTD Techniques
Host-based MTD techniques are those that vary some aspect of the computing platform itself. The technique may vary aspects of the operating system (OS), application code, or properties of the platform [5] . More specifically host-based techniques often use one or more of the following mechanisms:
Dynamic Runtime Environment: The OS dynamically varies some aspect of the runtime environment presented to the application. The approach includes mechanisms that vary the location in memory of application program code, libraries, stack/heap, and functions. Also included are mechanisms varying the interface presented to an application (e.g., system calls for I/O devices).
Dynamic Application Code and Application Data:
Includes mechanisms that vary some aspect of application code during runtime (e.g., instruction ordering) or representation of application data (e.g., encoding).
B. Platform-based MTD Techniques
Dynamic Platform: Includes mechanisms that result in variation of host platform properties such as OS type and/or version or CPU architecture.
C. Network-based MTD Techniques
The network-based MTD technique class includes MTD techniques that dynamically vary network aspects of a distributed computer network system. Any aspect providing network connectivity and enabling system transactions across multiple computing platforms is a candidate for MTD techniques. Example techniques included in this class are dynamic IP address and/or port randomization [6] , routing path randomization [7] , and proxy-location randomization [8] . The fundamental idea for these techniques is periodically changing the structure of the network an adversary must use to access resources or data in the protected computer network system. Challenges with varying structure or parameters of the underlying network of an information system include synchronizing legitimate access for components of the distributed information system while disrupting reconnaissance and attacks from an adversary. Additionally, network protocols must operate through a network-based MTD technique, such as a TCP connection that must be maintained and not be broken and reestablished. Finally, nodes under the MTD umbrella must be able to connect or communicate with legacy or unsupported devices, either network elements or endpoints. This latter concern may actually have a greater impact on network services, security and packet forwarding than affecting the adversary's attempts at reconnaissance or attack.
SDN technology enables network-based MTD but creates challenges in experimentation since simulation has only recently begun to support system analysis of SDN enabled systems.
Additionally, IPv6 with its significant increase in IP address space creates opportunity for deployment of network-based MTD. One example is the extensive work done by Virginia Tech researchers in their Moving Target IPv6 Defense (MT6D) developments [9] .
III. CHALLENGES TO ASSESSING MTD
MTD used in computer network systems can operate over the full spectrum of system components. MTD can be host-based and create movement in the host and/or can be across the broader system with IP address rotation schemes. Each MTD technology or approach must be evaluated and analyzed with a focus on its specific movement aspects along with the class of cyber-attack it claims to defend against. Performing empirical analysis to assess the effectiveness of MTD necessitates constructing experiments that capture the effects of MTD technologies under conditions representative of its target operational environment. This includes the MTD technology and approach along with expected legitimate system behaviors and also attack representations it is designed to defend against.
Researchers have also proposed methods to perform analysis of MTD with theoretical approaches. Experimental approaches should be considered as a complimentary analysis and not a replacement of theoretical analysis. An example theory for assessing MTD [10] is based on the approach's basic properties of uncertainty, diversification, and randomization to define a concept of entropy as it applies to MTD. This approach along with other theoretical approaches continues to be an open area of research.
IV. MTD ANALYSIS WITH EXPERIMENTATION
An MTD is often tooled with a particular threat surface in mind; the moving target aspect is employed to increase the time and effort an attacker must invest in gaining a foothold on the asset. An initial step in identifying proper experiments for empirical analysis of MTD is grouping similar approaches. The grouping produces categories addressing each threat surface as unique and exclusive (although operationally, there may be overlaps), affording an appropriate environment for deployment testing of the MTD technique. Under each category, one or many threat surfaces may manifest, and threat vectors within each of the threat surfaces may be tailored to inflict harm or compromise the security of the targeted asset. The experiment environment must also include necessary fidelity factors to facilitate adequate or sufficient functionality testing of the MTD's moving parts and fidelity to represent the threat vector or cyber-attack technique.
Elements necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of MTD techniques are metrics describing the security benefit and operational cost of deploying the defense or defensive work factor. Defensive work factor metrics are described in detail in [3] and are not discussed in this research paper. Metrics describing security benefits or effectiveness in thwarting attacks remain an area of research. Identifying or creating metrics to quantitatively describe the efficacy of an MTD approach is an important problem and is a subset of the wellknown hard problem of cyber security metrics. Difficulties with creating meaningful security metrics and limitations of measuring trust in an absolute sense are described in [11] . Metrics that quantitatively describe the efficacy of MTD from a defensive position continue to receive attention. Various approaches to measure defensive effectiveness of an MTD can be found in numerous publications [12] . Metrics are used, in many cases, to inform decisions on applying security measures to achieve some desired security posture.
A. Analysis environments and required experiment fidelity
Selecting an appropriate environment for experimentation and identifying what fidelity is necessary to achieve useful experiment results is key in MTD technology and approach analysis. Typically, experiments are constrained by the time and cost to perform the experiment and thus the analysts desire focused experiments that will answer their questions. In the case of MTD, the question may be, how effective is network IP address randomization at thwarting an outsider mapping your network?
Or, how effective is OS randomization at preventing a privilege escalation attack? These example questions are best answered through experiments constructed with an emphasis on fidelity in specific but different parts of the experiment. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 provide insights to the appropriate environment and where to focus fidelity for analysis of specific types and classes of MTD technologies and approaches. Additionally, the tables include cyber-attack techniques and kill chain details to guide experiment design. Both host-based MTD and platform-based MTD include dynamic techniques involving the end-point operating system. Host-based MTD dynamic techniques modify operating system internals. Platform-based dynamic techniques move between multiple, unmodified operating systems.
The tables also include the attack technique(s) the MTD is believed to be effective against [5] and also includes the phase of the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain the MTD will disrupt. The attack technique(s) and kill chain guide the analyst further in experiment design and construction and are discussed further in Section V. The MTD approaches described in the above tables are described in research papers and, in some cases, actual implementations are available. Our research has focused primarily on assessing network-based MTD.
V. TEST ENVIRONMENTS FOR MTD EXPERIMENTS
Knowledge of the mapping of the MTD technology to be analyzed under the specific attacks of interest and the appropriate test environment and experiment fidelity is necessary to design and construct experiments. Virtualization platforms along with actual operational system software, emulation technologies, and simulation environments are used to enable MTD technology analysis experiments.
A. Host-and platform-based MTD experiments
As shown in Tables 1 and 2 above, host-or platform-based MTD techniques typically require fidelity in operating system and application. In these cases, models of production or operational system hosts are generated then imported into the virtualization platform. The models of operational system hosts should include operating system, any host-based add-on security, and user applications as required (to promote system load to for direct testing of the application itself). The modeled hosts should be configured to replicate the operational system hosts. Consideration should be taken for the underlying hardware architecture (e.g. x86-64, ARM, etc), if instruction sets are a factor for the MTD.
For host-or platform-based MTD technologies, the experiment environment is exclusively made up of either models of operational hosts running on pure hardware or virtualization platforms. Virtualized platforms may require complete virtualization of the operating system and hardware, para-virtualization of the hardware (pass-through), or even containers. Simulation models representative of necessary host details to perform the MTD technology experiments would be impractical and typically do not exist.
Mechanisms to rapidly specify and deploy hosts to construct a range of simple to complex experimental systems to analyze MTD approaches are described in [5] . The experimental setup can include the full range of computer network system devices such as routers, switches, hosts, services, and applications as needed, to promote fidelity, load, or avenues through which an attack might occur.
B. Network-based MTD experiments
As shown in Table 3 above, network-based MTD techniques typically require fidelity in the network representation. Network representation may include network topology, device type, device operating system, and configuration. In a similar fashion to the host-based MTD analysis, network-based MTD analysis can construct experiments using virtualization platforms to represent not only end-points but also network devices. Numerous network devices deployed on virtualization platforms may be combined with host virtualization to create computer network system experiments.
Numerous contemporary network-based MTD technologies use SDN technologies to modify network attributes. SDN enables the implementation of obfuscation techniques, strict flow control for route diversity through a network, and granular filtering to confuse reconnaissance attempts. SDN deployments also use centralized control to provide flow rules to SDN switches. SDN controllers implement the SDN-based MTD algorithm(s). In the case of SDN-enabled MTD approaches, analysis should take into consideration additional attack surfaces introduced by the SDN control or management plane [15] . Several attack vectors targeting the SDN control plane may mitigate any benefit obtained from the MTD approach.
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C. Adding network traffic and services to experiments
Empirical analysis of MTD technologies and approaches with experimentation requires incorporating aspects that may impact an operational deployment of the MTD under evaluation. In order to establish a realistic and high fidelity model, applications and traffic generation should be added to the experiment. Applications with actual traffic production may be necessary to include in an experiment. Application delays can be measured to determine impacts to legitimate users of the system with deployed MTD technologies. In many cases, evaluation of security approaches, including MTD technologies, should be performed in the context of the overall system. Constructing experiments to include enterprise network services such as domain controllers and e-mail servers, may be necessary.
Evaluation of MTD technologies in experimentation environments and obtaining the necessary fidelity in specific parts of the system can be a tedious process if multiple experiments must be created, configured, and performed. A technique used by the authors for repeated configuration and deployment requiring point-and-click operations is to capture the operations from a user Virtual Network Computing (VNC) session. VNC is a graphical desktop sharing system using the Remote Frame Buffer protocol (RFB) and provides the capability to record and replay user configuration and deployment functions [16] .
D. Experiment design -Incorporating cyber-attack models
An additional aspect for creating experiments to assess the effectiveness of an MTD approach is identifying the type of cyber-attack and phase of cyber-attack the MTD defends against. The experiments must be constructed to enable faithful representation of the cyber-attack.
The analyst should have a comprehensive understanding of pertinent cyber-attacks, their classifications, and the applicability of MTD technology for defense. A cyber-attack taxonomy is an excellent tool to obtain a comprehensive understanding of threat surfaces in order to identify the various types of attacks and their modes of action so an appropriate experiment can be created evaluating the effectiveness of the MTD technology.
A cyber-attack taxonomy will help an analyst understand how an adversary operates and is essential to effectively model a cyber-attack. Numerous research papers have proposed various cyber-attack taxonomies [18] . One taxonomy is called AVOIDIT (Attack Vector, Operational Impact, Defense, Information Impact, and Target) [19] . The approach classifies attacks under multiple overlapping categories and provides the defender with countermeasure insights including those offered by MTD. Another taxonomy is derived from Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [20] , which provides an exhaustive list of attack categories and continues to grow as new cyber-attack mechanisms are discovered. An earlier version of this list was used by [5] and in our cyberattack modeling for MTD assessment experiments we will use the current version of this taxonomy to guide our cyber-attack model construction.
In CAPEC the attack patterns are organized hierarchically based on mechanisms used when attackers attempt to exploit vulnerabilities. This information supports experiment creation by guiding the construction of appropriate test cases for modeling attacks more realistically. The taxonomy is engaged during the cyber-attack model construction for the MTD experiments and is used as a threat-informed guiding framework for attack modeling.
In our experiments, the MTD under study is classified by the specific system entity it changes (i.e., makes dynamic) and falls into a category listed in Table 1 , 2, or 3. Using the system entity the MTD protects as a guide, our methodology uses CAPEC Mechanisms of Attack information to find the classes of attacks the system entity is susceptible. CAPEC provides specific attack information that is used to construct attack models used in the evaluation of the MTD technique. For example, in the case of an IP address randomization MTD, the system entity it changes (i.e., makes dynamic) is the network; thus evaluation of IP randomization MTD should focus on attack classes that use network-based mechanisms as described in the CAPEC taxonomy. Section VI provides an example of this threat informed methodology of attack modeling.
Relisting the entire CAPEC taxonomy is not in the scope of this paper, however, Tables 1, 2 , and 3 include an "Attack Technique(s) Mitigated" column that list the specific attack technique as listed in the CAPEC taxonomy.
Typically cyber-attacks proceed through multiple steps to achieve some goal. The attack steps can be described as a cyber-attack kill chain. A cyber kill chain is an additional tool to enable the construction of cyber-attack models. The analyst uses knowledge of the kill chain step the MTD under study intends to protect to construct the cyber-attack model.
In our experiment methodology, the cyber kill chain guides the cyber-attack model to focus on the specific intent of an cyber actor. For example, if the MTD under study has an objective to disrupt attackers during the reconnaissance phase then the experiment fidelity should be faithful to modeling an attack intended to collect information about the computer network system and the modeled computer network system should have fidelity in information sources. In this example, experiment fidelity in attacker mechanisms to install an exploit SW or exfiltrate data is not needed.
The experiment approach described in this paper uses the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain [17] . Steps included in the kill chain and example attacker actions for each step are:
1. Reconnaissance: The attacker seeks system information to identify potential gaps in system security; e.g., runs nmap, etc. 2. Weaponization: Builds a malicious attachment. 3. Delivery: Delivers it using targeted email, drive-by download, etc. 4. Exploitation: A system user opens the file and the vulnerability is exploited. 5. Installation: Malware immediately installs on the client. 6. Command & Control: Attacker takes control of the system. 7. Actions on Objectives: Attacker is able to pinpoint and access critical data. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 include an "LM Cyber Kill Chain Disruption Phase(s)" column that list the specific step(s) the MTD under study intends to disrupt. In experiment construction the experiment fidelity must faithfully model that step of a cyber-attack.
Experimentation in realistic environments provides insights into weaknesses of MTD technologies and how they may manifest themselves in an actual deployment. For example, consider dynamic networks where network features such as routes, service locations, or IP addresses are changed. These defenses may hinder legitimate users of the system since services are expected to be in known locations of the network. Furthermore, some dynamic network MTD approaches create isolated networks disrupting intended functionality of the system. If an outside network cannot access the dynamic network, its intended purpose is disrupted.
VI. EXAMPLE EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF MTD
An example experiment is included to demonstrate the empirical MTD assessment approach discussed in this paper. The objective of the experiment is to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of an IP address randomizer MTD developed at Sandia National Laboratories [21] . The experiment model is constructed to assess the MTD approach in an enterprise-like computer network system with access to the public Internet using a firewall and DMZ. A cyber-attack model is constructed from well-known and publically available attack mechanisms. The assessment of the MTD approach is evaluated by comparing the effectiveness of the cyber-attack achieving its objectives in experiments, first, without and then with the MTD deployed on the modeled computer network system. Details of the experiment and how experiment fidelity is achieved are presented in the following sections.
A. Enterprise-like Computer Network System Model
An enterprise-like computer network system with access to the public Internet using a firewall and DMZ is used for the experiment evaluation. The network topology has a single firewall controlling traffic flows between the external facing Internet and internal facing enterprise. The enterprise is comprised of a core router with four internal LANs representing different enterprise segments including an enterprise services LAN where enterprise servers and enterprise services are located. Each of the internal enterprise LANs are comprised of numerous workstations and servers.
The enterprise firewall includes a DMZ where a proxy and external email servers are located. The firewall is configured such that internal to external connectivity must go through a DMZ device. External to the firewall is an enterprise-external LAN and numerous other workstations/servers including an external email server that can function as attacker workstation in an experiment. The enterprise network is broken into multiple subnets each having a 16-bit routing prefix. The topology of the demonstrate computer network is shown in Figure 1 . The demonstration experiment includes using publically available attack against a vulnerable Internet Explorer application on a Windows 7 endpoint. Thus the demonstration experiment required actual unpatched Windows OS to be included in the experiment. This required the use of virtualized Widows OS running on x86 hardware.
B. Network-based MTD Under Evaluation
The objective of the experiment is to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of an IP address randomizer MTD. The network-based MTD utilizes SDN to implement an innovative IP address randomization approach that is independent of DNS lookup and does not disrupt active TCP connections during its IP address rotations. This IP address randomization technique provides obfuscation of packet header IP address fields on data links and network devices providing connectivity between endpoints or LANs. The IP address randomization is enabled by a SDN switch at each end of the MTD-secured link or network segment. The SDN switches depend on an out-of-band control channel to coordinate and synchronize the address rotation. Selecting a 16-bit routing prefix for the enterprise networks provides a larger address space for randomization.
For experimentation purposes the SDN switches are treated as LAN segments for the respective Windows endpoints. The experiment topology represents a group of Windows endpoints able to access the corporate network through an edge-based SDN fabric via which the IP address randomization MTD was deployed. The core and distribution routing devices are left as "legacy" (not SDN controlled) to show how such devices may still route/forward with IP randomization enabled in the network.
C. Experiment Cyber-Attack Modeling
The objective of the experiment is to assess the protection provided by the network-based MTD under study. A networkbased MTD was selected and Table 3 is used to identify the class of cyber-attacks and the kill chain steps the MTD offers protection against. Table 3 shows the specific attacks should come from the Gather Information -{Interception, footprinting} CAPEC Category. The kill chain directs the experiment to evaluate the reconnaissance and delivery phases.
A realistic cyber-attack model is constructed from well-known and publically available attack mechanisms. The cyber-attack is initiated from the model's external network with an attacker objective of gaining access to specific endpoints located in the enterprise internal network. The attack proceeds as follows:
1. An enterprise administrator (admin) logs into a vulnerable Windows workstation on the DMZ and logs into a domain using credentials. 2. The admin opens an email and was phished to browse to a website running on the attacker's workstation. 3. The admin's workstation is compromised using a driveby download technique and Silverlight Exploit [22] . 4. Having a compromised endpoint in the DMZ, the attacker uploads nmap and scans enterprise. Scan information provides information on additional exploitable endpoints.
5. Pivoting through compromised DMZ workstation, attacker is able to compromise additional endpoints. 6. Gaining access to additional endpoints enables the attacker to repeat network scans and identifies more endpoints for targeting and enterprise-file asset theft.
In this experiment the objective of the network-based MTD is to disrupt the Reconnaissance and Delivery steps of the kill chain. The attack is performed on the experiment computer network system with identical execution.
D. Experiment Results
Without the IP randomization MTD installed the attacker was able to scan the network from the initial DMZ compromised workstations and deliver additional tools to other exploitable endpoints. The attacker was able to obtain information from the entire enterprise network once access to the DMZ was obtained.
With IP randomization implemented on the enterprise system some security was provided to workstations on the system. For the experiment scenario the benefits of the IP randomization MTD were:
1. Since the admin workstation in the DMZ had access to both the external network (i.e., Internet) and enterprise network the network-based MTD did not prevent the compromise via the drive-by download. 2. Since the admin workstation in the DMZ had access to some enterprise endpoints on the same IP address randomizer network, the MTD did not prevent the scanning of these workstations. However, endpoints that were not part of the IP address randomizer yet used the same network infrastructure were not accessible for reconnaissance by the DMZ compromised workstation. 3. Only if a workstation participated in multiple IP randomized MTD networks and one of which the attacker compromised could the attacker access multiple networks.
The experiment demonstrated the security mechanisms of an MTD and limits of an MTD approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
Assessing properties of MTD technologies and approaches, in cases, is best performed with live experimentation. Welldesigned experiments are necessary to create necessary interactions with the MTD under study and surrounding environment, including the cyber intrusion it intends to defend. Constructing experiments with real hardware and software can be a daunting and costly task. The necessary data to assess MTD technologies can be obtained through experiments constructed in simulation, emulation, real HW/SW, and hybrid environments. However, to obtain useful data, experiments must be constructed to produce the necessary fidelity in the corresponding parts of the computer network system. This paper provides guidance on the types of experiments and experiment fidelity location to assess specific types and classes of MTD technologies. A demonstration experiment was presented to assess the effectiveness of a network-based MTD.
